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LENDING  IN  MALL  FIRM  FINANCE 
This paper examines the role of_.relationship..lending.using  a 
data set on small firm finance.  We specifically  examine price and 
nonprice terms of commercial bank lines of credit  (L/C) extended to 
small firms.  Our focus on bank L/Cs allows us to examine a type of 
loan contract where the bank-borrower relationship  is likely to be 
an important mechanism  for solving asymmetric information problems 
associated  with  financing  small  enterprises.  We  find  that 
borrowers  with  longer  banking  relationships  tend  to  pay  lower 
interest  rates  and  are  less  likely to pledge  collateral.  These 
results are consistent  with theoretical arguments that relationship 
lending generates  valuable  information about borrower  quality. LINRS OF CRBDIT AND RELATIONSHIP 
LENDING  IN MALL  FIRM FINANCE 
I.  Jntroduction 
Large corporations  typically obtain credit in the public debt 
markets,  while  small  firms  usually  must  depend  on  financial 
intermediaries, particularly commercial banks.  Given that asymmet- 
ric information  problems tend to be much more acute in small firms 
than in large firms, it is not surprising that the  manners  in which 
these  respective  groups  obtain  credit  financing  differ  signifi- 
cantly.  Bank  financing  often  involves  a  long-term  relationship 
that may help attenuate these 
debt  financing  generally  does 
The abilities  to acquire 
borrower  quality  and  to  use 
contracts  largely defines the 
information problems, whereas public 
not have this feature. 
private  information  over time about 
this  information  in  designing  debt 
unique nature of commercial  banking. 
This  is consistent  with theories of financial  intermediation  that 
emphasize  the  information  advantages  of  banks  (e.g.,  Diamond 
1984,1991,  Ramakrishnan  and Thakor  1984, Boyd and Prescott  1986). 
Recently,  a  theoretical  literature  on  relationship  lending  has 
appeared  which  provides  predictions  about how loan interest  rates 
evolve over the course of a bank-borrower relationship.  The models 
of Boot  and  Thakor  (1993) and  Petersen  and Rajan  (1993) predict 
that  rates  should  decline  as  a  relationship  matures,  while  the 
models  of  Sharpe  (1990) 
rates  over  time.  Boot 
collateral  requirements 
and  Wilson  (1993) predict  increases  in 
and  Thakor's  model  also  predicts  that 
on  loans  will  be  lower,  the  longer  a 2 
borrower has had a banking relationship.  The main purpose 
paper  is to provide  empirical  tests of these theoretical 
tions using  an extensive  data set on small firm finance. 
of this 
predic- 
Two  strands  of  the  literature  have  provided  some  empirical 
evidence on the value of bank-borrower_relationships...In..the  first 
strand,  studies  of  "bank  uniqueness"  addressed  the  question  of 
whether banks produce valuable private information about borrowers 
(e.g., James 1987, Lummer and McConnell1989,  Hoshi et al. 1990a,b, 
James  and  Weir  1990,  Wansley  et  al.  1992,  Billet  et  al.  1993, 
Shockley  and  Thakor  1993).  Among  other  things,  these  studies 
provided  evidence  that the existence of a bank-borrower  relation- 
ship increases  firm value.  Some of these studies also  indirectly 
provided  evidence  about  the  value  of  the  strenath  of  a  bank- 
borrower  relationship.  They found that announcements  of renewals 
of  bank  lines  of  credit  (L/Cs) often  generate  greater  abnormal 
market  returns  than newly issued L/Cs. 
The  second  strand  of  the  empirical  relationship  lending 
literature provided more direct tests of the strength of the bank- 
borrower  relationship  (Petersen  and  Rajan  1993,1994).  These 
studies  used  a  continuous  measure  of  the  strength  of  the  bank- 
borrower  relationship  -- its duration  -- as opposed to the simple 
new-versus-renewal  L/C distinction.  Perhaps  surprisingly,  these 
studies  did not  find that the rate charged on a loan depended  on 
the  strength  of  the  relationship,  although  other  evidence  of 
relationship  lending was found in the firm's trade credit arrange- 
ments. 3 
Our analysis is similar to this second strand of the empirical 
literature  in  that  we  focus  on  the  length  of  the  bank-borrower 
relationship  as  a measure  of  its  strength.  We  also  share  with 
these studies a focus on small, mostly untraded firms for which the 
bank-borrower.relationship_is~ikely..to~e~mportant.  ..This  differs 
from the bank uniqueness  studies, which generally  concentrated  on 
large, publicly traded firms that may be less dependent  on banking 
relationships.  Our study and the Petersen  and Rajan  (1993,1994) 
studies  also  share  a  third  advantage  over  the  bank  uniqueness 
studies.  We  are  able  to  test  directly  the  predictions  of  the 
recent theoretical models  of relationship lending about the  path of 
loan interest rates over the course of the relationship. 
However,  our  approach  differs  from  the  Petersen  and  Rajan 
(1993,1994)  studies  in  two  important  ways.  First,  we  focus 
exclusively  on  lending  under  L/Cs.  .  The  L/C  is  an  attractive 
vehicle for studying the bank-borrower relationship because the L/C 
itself  represents  a  formalization  of  this  relationship.  By 
limiting our study to L/Cs, we exclude from our data set most loans 
which are "transaction-driven,@@  rather than Velationship-driven,11 
and may avoid diluting  our relationship  lending results. 
Second, we analyze  the empirical association between relation- 
ship lending and the collateral decision, providing  the first test 
of Boot and Thakor's  (1993)  theoretical predictions about collater- 
al.  In  the  process,  we  also  test  some  propositions  from  the 
collateral  literature  about  the  associations  among  collateral, 
borrower  risk, and loan risk. 4 
Our data are drawn from the National  Survey  of Small Business 
Finances  (NSSBF)  which  contains  extensive  information  on  both 
borrowers  and  loan  contracts,  as  well  as  information  on  the 
relationship  between the bank and the borrower.  By way of preview, 
our empirical  results are.consistent_with_the_.theoretical.predic- 
tions of Boot and Thakor  (1993) and Petersen and Rajan  (1993).  We 
find that borrowers  with  longer banking relationships  pay a lower 
interest  rate  and  are  less  likely  to  pledge  collateral.  Our 
findings  are  also  consistent  with  much  of  the  bank  uniqueness 
literature.  However,  they conflict with the loan pricing  results 
in the  second  strand  of the empirical  bank-borrower  relationship 
literature,  which  draws  its  data  from  the  same  source.  We 
attribute this difference to our exclusive use of L/C loans, which 
are more  likely to reflect relationship  effects than other  loans. 
The paper  is organized as follows.  Section II discusses  the 
extant  literature  on relationship  lending.  Section  III describes 
the  data  set  and  motivates  the  variables  used  in the  analysis. 
Section  IV presents  our econometric tests of the determination  of 
the loan rate and whether collateral is pledged, .both  as functions 
of  the  strength  of  the  bank-borrower  relationship  and  other 
variables.  Section V concludes. 
II.  The RelationshiD Lendina Literature 
The information-based  literature on financial  intermediation 
(e.g., Diamond  1984,1991,  Ramakrishnan  and Thakor  1984, Boyd  and 
Prescott1986)  suggests that financial intermediaries exist because 5 
they enjoy economies of scale and/or comparative advantages  in the 
production  of  information  about  borrowers.  Banks  in particular 
specialize  in lending to a highly information-problematic  class of 
borrowers.  Because of this specialization, contracting  in the bank 
loan market  appears  to  differ_  substantially-from-contracting  in 
other  major  debt  markets  (see Carey  et  al.  1993).  One  feature 
often  ascribed  to  commercial  bank  lending  is  its  emphasis  on 
relationship  lending.'  Banks may acquire  information  through  the 
relationship  by  monitoring  borrower  performance  over  time  under 
credit arrangements  and/or through the provision of other services 
such as deposit  accounts  (see Allen, et al. 1991, Nakamura  1993), 
and use this  information  in designing  future credit contracts. 
Some studies have specifically modeled the association between 
the length of the bank-borrower relationship and loan pricing.  In 
an extension of Diamond  (1989), Petersen and Rajan  (1993) developed 
a theoretical  model  with  both adverse selection and moral hazard in 
which banks offer higher rates in the first period and lower rates 
in later periods after borrower types have been revealed.  Boot and 
Thakor  (1993) demonstrated  that  the  length  of  the  bank-borrower 
relationship  may be important in determining  loan prices even in a 
model without  learning.  They also found that collateral  require- 
ments are related to the length of the relationship.  Borrowers pay 
a high  rate  and pledge  collateral  early  in the relationship,  and 
then  pay  a  lower  rate  and do not pledge  collateral  later  in the 
'Some theoretical  papers  have  formally  examined  the  choice 
between bank debt and public debt (e.g.,  Diamond 1991, Rajan 1992). relationship  after they have demonstrated  some project  success. 
The  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1993) and  Boot  and  Thakor  (1993) 
6 
results stand in contrast to other theoretical models.  Both Sharpe 
(1990)  and  Wilson  (1993)  demonstrated  conditions  under  which 
lenders subsidize borrowers in_early._periods_and..are_reimbursed  for 
this subsidy in later periods.  Thus, the issue of the association 
between  loan pricing and the length of the bank-borrower  relation- 
ship is ultimately  an empirical one.  In addition, as noted above, 
no  one  has  previously  tested  the  empirical  association  between 
collateral  and the length of the bank-borrower  relationship. 
The bank L/C is a particularly  important part of relationship 
lending  because  it  represents  a  forward  commitment  to  provide 
working  capital  financing  under pre-specified  terms.*  It  is not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  much  of the  empirical  literature  on 
bank  uniqueness  has  focused  on  bank  L/Cs.  James  (1987)  found 
positive  abnormal  returns  associated  with  announcements  of  firms 
who  were  granted  bank  L/Cs.  Lummer  and  McConnell  (1989)  and 
Wansley  et  al.  (1992)  found  evidence  that  James'  results  were 
driven  by L/C renewals  as opposed to newly  initiated  L/Cs.  This 
result  is consistent  with  the  notion  that  information  about  the 
borrower  is acquired over time through the bank-borrower  relation- 
*Most  L/Cs contain material adverse change  (MAC) clauses which 
permit  the  bank  to  abrogate  the  commitment  if  the  borrower's 
financial  condition  has  changed  substantially.  However,  these 
clauses can only be contingent on verifiable characteristics  of the 
borrower.  In addition,  because  of reputation  effects  and  lender 
liability  laws,  banks  may  be  reluctant  to  invoke  these  clauses 
except under extreme conditions  (see Avery and Berger  1991). ship and is reflected  in the continuation  of credit  arrangements, 
as opposed  to initial credit assessments.  Billet,  et al.  (1993), 
however,  found  no difference  in the announcement  effects  between 
new and renewal L/Cs.'  One explanation for these disparate results 
may be that the newTrenewal  binomial..categcrization..of  L/Cs  is at 
best  a weak  measure  of the strength  of the relationship.  As  in 
Petersen  and Rajan  (1993,1994), we avoid this measurement  problem 
by using the continuous duration of the bank-borrower  relationship 
as a measure  of its strength.  Also, unlike  the uniqueness  event 
studies  which  focus primarily  on large 
use data on small mostly untraded firms, 
bank-dependent. 
publicly  traded  firms,  we 
which tend to be much more 
Petersen and Rajan  (1993,1994) also used  the NSSBF data source 
to  analyze  relationship  lending.  Like  our paper,  they  used  the 
length  of  the  bank-borrower  relationship  as  a  measure  of  its 
strength.  They  found  no  statistical  association  between  the 
strength  of  the  bank-borrower  relationship  and  business  loan 
pricing  in their 1994 paper  (they did not include the length of the 
bank-borrower  relationship  in the  loan pricing  equation  in their 
1993 paper).  However,  they did find evidence  of a lesser  depen- 
dence on trade  credit by firms with longer banking  relationships, 
supporting  the  value  of relationship  lending.  Their  failure  to 
3Billet, et al.  (1993) also found higher abnormal returns  for 
higher-rated  lenders.  Other  papers  have  found  that  the  loan 
announcement-related  abnormal returns may be associated  with  firm 
characteristics.  Slovin et al. (1992) found a negative association 
with firm size and Best and Zhang (1992) found a positive  associa- 
tion with declining  or uncertain  earnings  forecasts. 8 
find evidence  of relationship  lending in bank loan pricing,  which 
runs  counter  to our findings  below, may be attributable  to their 
inclusion  of all tvnes of external loans in their data set rather 
than  focusing  on bank  L/Cs.'  That  is, they  included  a number  of 
different  types  of-loans _for,which,reputation.-and-relationship 
effect6  may  be substantially  less important than those associated 
with  the  forward  commitment  embodied  in an  L/C.  These  non-L/C 
loans  include  equipment  loans, auto  loans, mortgages,  and  short- 
term spot loans.  In the parlance of Wall Street, these loans tend 
to  be  "transaction-driven"  rather  than  Velationship-driven.11 
Thus,  the  loan  pricing  effect  of  relationships  may  have  been 
diluted  by  the  inclusion  of  these'  loans  in  their  samples.  In 
contrast,  we limit our analysis to just loans drawn under  L/Cs.' 
III.  The Data Set 
The NSSBF  provides  more  extensive  information  on  individual 
small  businesses  than  any other  publicly  available  source.  The 
survey was  conducted  in 1988-89 by the Federal Reserve  Board  and 
the Small Business Administration  (SBA).  The data were obtained by 
telephone  interviews  with  executives  of  about  3,400  businesses. 
'Petersen  and  Rajan  excluded  loans  from  the  owner  or  the 
owner's  family.  By  focusing  on just bank  L/Cs,  we  also  exclude 
these  loans from our data set. 
'Petersen and Rajan  (1993,1994) also examined the association 
between  loan rates  and the age of the  firm and  found  that  older 
firms had  lower borrowing  costs, as we find below.  Petersen  and 
Rajan  (1993)  found  that  this  association  was  stronger  in  less 
concentrated  markets. 9 
Each  interview  consisted  of  about  200  questions  covering  firm 
description, governance, history, use of credit, relationships with 
financial  institutions,  and balance sheet and income information. 
The respondents  represent  a stratified random  sample  by size  and 
geography  of  for-profit,  nonagricultural,_-nonfinancial  firms. 
Approximately  80% of the sample had less than 50 employees;  10% had 
51-100 employees; and 10% had 101-500 employees.  Nearly all of the 
firms were privately owned -- only about 0.5% were publicly traded. 
Asset  size  ranged  up  to  $219  million.  The  geographical 
representation  was  also  relatively  uniform,  with  about  25%  each 
from the Northeastern, North Central, Southern, and Western states. 
Table  1 describes  the variables  used  in this  study,  broken 
down into five main categories:  L/C contract characteristics,  firm 
financial  characteristics,  firm  governance  characteristics, 
industry characteristics, andinformation/relationshipcharacteris- 
tics.  Looking first at the contract characteristics  of commercial 
L/Cs, PREM is the premium over the prime rate at which  loans drawn 
under  the  L/C  are  priced.  COLLAT  indicates  whether  the  L/C  is 
secured, which  is further decomposed by type of security  -- ARINV 
for  L/Cs  secured  by  accounts  receivable  and/or  inventory,  and 
OTHERSEC  for other security.  ARINV may be particularly  revealing 
because  practitioners  tend  to  view  L/Cs  secured  by  accounts 
receivable  and  inventory  as the riskiest type of working  capital 
financing.  This type of financing is often referred to as "asset- 
based lending,  *@  where the value of the assets pledged'is of primary 
concern  to the  lender rather than the cash flow prospects  of the 10 
firm.  Asset-based lending generally involves a form of intense 
monitoring not associated with other types of loans.6*7  OTHEBSEC 
includes all other types of collateral,  including  equipment, real 
estate, and  personal assets of the  owners.  The  inclusion of 
different..tvnes_.of  collateraldistinguishes-our-paper  .from  previous 
studies of business lending. 
GUAR indicates  whether the L/C is guaranteed.  Guarantees are 
generally  provided  by the firm's  owners,  giving  the lender  recourse 
against the owners for any deficiency  in payment by the borrowing 
firm.  Guarantees  are similar  to the  pledging  of personal  collater- 
al, although  they do not involve  specific  liens. COMPBAL indicates 
whether the L/C has a compensating  balance requirement. 
The  financial characteristics of the  firm consist  of  key 
financial ratios, including  the leverage  ratio (LEV),  the current 
ratio (CUBPBAT),  the quick ratio (QUICKPAT),  accounts receivable 
turnover (ARTURN),  inventory  turnover (INVTURN),  accounts payable 
turnover (APTURN),  and total assets (TA). 
The uovernance characteristics  include  the legal form of the 
%wary  and Udell (1988)  argued that this type of monitoring 
may produce information  about overall firm performance as well as 
information about the value of the ARINV collateral itself. 
7The  SBA recently announced  a new loan program which for the 
first time will provide a government  guarantee  for L/Cs secured by 
ARINv.  This  is  a  significant departure  for  the  SBA,  which 
previously  had substantially  limited the  scope  of its  guarantees  to 
amortizing term loans.  Some lenders  have expressed concern about 
the new proqram because of the intense  monitorinu associated with 
ARIIW  and  because of  the perceived riskiness 6f  this  type  of 
secured lending (Selz  1994). 11 
firm -- CORP for  (non-Subchapter S) corporation,  SUBS for Subchap- 
ter  S  corporation,  PART  for  partnership,  and  PROP  for  sole 
proprietorship.  OWNMG  indicates  whether  the  firm  was  owner- 
managed,  and CONCSO  signifies whether  50% or more was  owned  by a 
single  family. 
Industry characteristics  are reflected in dummy variables  for 
whether  the  firm  is  in  the  construction  (CONSTR),  services 
(SERVICES)  or  retail  (RETAIL)  industries.  The  bulk  of  the 
remaining respondents  (OTHERIND) were in the manufacturing  sector. 
The  information/relationshiD  characteristics  consist  of AGE 
and  RELATE.  AGE  refers  to  the  number  of  years  that  current 
ownership has been in place.  If the firm is currently owned by its 
founders,  then AGE represents  the actual age of the firm.  RELATE 
is the number  of years that the firm has purchased  its L/Cs  from 
its current  lender, and represents our measure  of the strength  of 
the  bank-borrower  relationship.'  RELATE  captures  the  ability  of 
the  bank  to  learn  more  about  the  nature  of  the  borrowing  firm 
through  its lending relationship.  There is an important  distinc- 
tion between AGE and RELATE.  AGE reflects information that becomes 
revealed  to  the market  as a whole,  i.e.,  its public  reputation, 
while  RELATE  reflects  private  information  revealed  through  the 
intermediation process only to the lender through  the  bank-borrower 
relationship.  As  noted  earlier,  RELATE  is  likely  a  superior 
measure  of the  strength  of the relationship  than  the distinction 
'An upper  limit  of  30 years .was imposed  on AGE  and  RELATE. 
For the few publicly  traded firms, AGE was also set equal to 30. 12 
between  new and renewal L/Cs used in Lummer and McConnell  (1989), 
Wansley  et al.  (1992), and Billet et al.  (1993). 
The  means  of  these  variables  for the  entire  sample  of  872 
firms who reported  L/Cs are shown in the first column of Table  2. 
These  means  reveal  several,interestingxharacteristics  of  small 
firms  using  credit  lines.  The  vast  majority  are  owner-managed 
(89%) with  a  single  family  owning  more  than  half  of  the  stock 
(80%).  Most  are also organized  as non-subchapter  S corporations 
(55%).  Consistent  with  other data  sources,  the majority  of the 
L/Cs  are  secured  (53%),  usually  with  accounts  receivable  and 
inventory  (36%).  Only 7% of all L/Cs in the sample have compensat- 
ing balance  requirements,  suggesting that this pricing  element  no 
longer plays a prominent  role for small firms. 
We  also  split the sample roughly  in half between  firms with 
assets above and below $500,000.  As shown in columns two and three 
of Table  2, the data suggest that firms with assets  greater  than 
$500,000 may be quite different from smaller firms in that they are 
much  more  likely  to be corporations,  much  more  likely  to  pledge 
collateral,  generally have lower liquidity ratios and lower profit 
margins,  and tend to pay a lower PRBM.  We emphasize that $500,000 
in  assets  is  quite  small,  and  that  our  subsample  above  this 
threshold  should still be considered to be small firms. 
IV.  Econometric  Boecification  and Test Results 
Loan Rate  Tests 
. 
Our loan rate tests analyze the determinants of PRBM, the loan 13 
rate premium  over the bank's prime rate. 
loan  contract,  financial,  governance, 
tion/relationship  characteristics  of the 
the  opportunity  to  examine  the  role  of 
commercial  loan contracting  by-measuring 
the interest rate of an L/C. 
PREM is regressed  on the 
industry,  and  informa- 
firm.  These tests offer 
relationship  lending  in 
_the_effect..of.RELATE on 
The NSSBF data set includes data on the interest rate paid on 
the  firm's  most  recent  loan, which  is often  drawn  under  an L/C. 
The survey also gives  information on whether the loan was  indexed 
to the prime and, if so, the premium over prime  (PREM), and whether 
it was floating or fixed rate.  For purposes of this analysis,  the 
cleanest  data  for  loan-by-loan  comparison  comes  from  using  only 
floating  rate  L/C  loans  which  were  indexed  to  the  bank's  prime 
rate.9 
The PREM results  for the entire sample are shown  in Table  3. 
The first column of the table excludes the potentially  endogenous 
loan contract variables  for collateral, guarantees, and compensat- 
ing balances,  and should be viewed  as the reduced  form for PREM. 
The  coefficients  of the  included variables  may be  interpreted  as 
the effects  of these variables  on the rate,  inclusive  of the any 
predicted  rate-reducing  effect  of  collateral,  guarantees,  and 
compensating  balances  that  they  may  imply.  For  example,  the 
coefficient  of LEV represents the association between  leverage and 
'Fixed  rate  L/C  loans  were  excluded  because  of  problems 
associated  with  the term  structure  of interest rates,  prepayment 
possibilities,  and imprecise information on the takedown  date. 14 
the rate on the loan after taking into account the expected values 
of collateral, guarantees and compensating balances that a marginal 
increase  in leverage  implies.  Thus, the coefficients  of the firm 
characteristics  in column one can also be interpreted as reflecting 
the association  between these..characteristics._and.,the-risk.of  the 
loan, as reflected  in its price. 
Column  two  of table  3 includes  all of the  variables  in the 
first  column  plus  the  collateral,  guarantee,  and  compensating 
balance contract variables.  The interpretation of the borrower and 
relationship  characteristics  now  reflect  their  effects  on  the 
premium  excludinq  their  effects  through  the  contract  terms." 
Thus,  the  coefficients  of the'firrp'characteristics in column  two 
can also be interpreted as reflecting the association between these 
characteristics  and the risk of the borrower,  as reflected  in the 
loan price.  The regression  in column three includes only the loan 
contract  terms on the right-hand  side. 
The most interesting results in column one of Table 3 are the 
importance  of  the  information/relationship  variables,  AGE  and 
RELATE.  The  statistically  significant  negative  coefficients  of 
these  variables  indicate  that the  older  the  firm  is in terms  of 
current  ownership  and  the  longer  the  banking  relationship, 
loIt  may  be noted that a bias could occur 
equation  because  the  collateral,  guarantee,  _  _ 
in estimating  this 
and  compensating 
the 
balance  variables  are  endogenous  to  the  firm  and  relationship 
characteristics.  We  assume  a recursive  model  structure  here  in 
which  the  firm  characteristics  explain  the  contract  terms  up  to 
random  errors that are not significantly  correlated  with the PREM 
error term. 15 
lower  the  rate  on  the  loan  (inclusive  of  any  collateral  and 
guarantee effects associated with these variables).  The magnitudes 
of the AGE and RELATE coefficients of about -.02 each suggest that 
an additional  10 years of business experience in which the firm has 
a constant relationship with the.same_bank..lowers_the.interest  rate 
on L/C loans by about 40 basis points  ((10+10)*.02 percent).  Thus, 
these  variables  appear  to be economically  significant  as well  as 
statistically  significant  in determining the rates paid on loans. 
An  important  distinction  should be made between  the AGE  and 
RELATE  coefficients,  each of which  is significant.  The  negative 
coefficient  on AGE  suggests  an important role  for reputation,  or 
publicly  available  information, which becomes available  over time 
to the lending community  as a whole.  The negative  coefficient  on 
RELATE suggests an important role for private  information acquired 
through  relationship  lending where  information  becomes  available 
only to the specific  lender through monitoring  over time. 
The  coefficients  on the financial  characteristics  in column 
one  are  generally  not  statistically  significant.  This  could  be 
because the risk-reducing  effects of collateral tend to offset the 
risk effect of these variables, or possibly because the statistical 
power of the regression  analysis  is not sufficiently  strong given 
the relatively  limited number of observations.  CORR and SUBS are 
negative  and  statistically  significant,  indicating  that  loans  to 
either type of corporation  tend to be safer than other  loans. 
The second column  in Table 3 includes the contract  variables 
as weil as all the firm and relationship variables from column one. 16 
Again,  AGE  is  negative  and  significant  indicating  that  longer 
public reputations  are associated with safer borrowers.  RELATE  is 
also  negative  and  significant,  providing  strong  evidence  of the 
importance  of relationship  lending and its role  in loan pricing. 
The magnitudes .of  both..coefficients-are.again.+about  -.02. 
The RELATE results in columns one and two are consistent  with 
the theoretical  models of Boot and Thakor  (1993) and Petersen  and 
Rajan  (1993).  They  may  also  shed  some  light  on  the  ambiguous 
results  found in the uniqueness  event studies which have examined 
the difference  in announcement effects between new L/Cs and renewal 
L/Cs.  These  studies  relied  on  what  may  be  a  relatively  weak 
binomial proxy for the strength of the bank-borrower relationship  - 
- whether  the L/C was new or a renewal.  Our methodology  permits  a 
more revealing  continuous measure of the relationship,  its length. 
Using  this  measure  (RELATE), we  find  that  the  strength  of  the 
relationship  is an important determinant  of loan pricing. 
We  next  deal  with  an  unresolved  issue  in  the  collateral 
literature -- the associations among collateral, borrower risk, and 
loan risk.  Most theoretical models of collateral demonstrate  that 
collateral  will  be  associated  with  safer  borrowers  and  loans 
(Bester 1985, Besanko and Thakor  1987a,b, Chan and Kanatas  1987), 
while others predict  that  riskier borrowers will more often pledge 
collateral  (Boot et al. 1991, Black and de Meza 1992).  Most of the 
empirical  collateral  literature supports the view that collateral 
is associated with riskier borrowers and loans (Orgler 1970, Hester 
1979,  Scott  and  Smith  1986,  Berger  and  Udell  1990,1992,  Booth 17 
1992,1993).  These empirical studies have been hampered by a dearth 
of data sources on the risk characteristics of individual borrowers 
and  the  lack  of  detailed  information  on  the  type  of  collateral 
pledged  -- problems that we can resolve with our detailed borrower 
information  and two types of.collateral. 
The regression  in column three of table 3, which includes only 
the loan contract terms on the right-hand side, tests the associa- 
tion  between  collateral  and  loan  risk.  The  collateral  tests 
presented  later  provide  some  evidence  that  secured  L/Cs  are 
associated  with  observably  riskier borrowers.  But this  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  secured  loans are relatively  risky  because 
recourse  against  collateral  reduces  the  risk  of  these  loans, 
possibly  to levels below those of unsecured loans.  The results  in 
column three of Table 3 show positive coefficients on both types of 
collateral,  indicating  higher  loan  rates  for  secured  loans, 
although  none  of  the  slope  coefficients  in  this  equation  are 
statistically  significant  and  the  explanatory  power  of  the 
regressors  is very low.  These results suggest that secured  loans 
may be riskier than unsecured  loans as found in prior studies, but 
the association  is not very strong and there is not sufficient test 
power to reject the null hypothesis of no statistical  association. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the same regressions as in Table 3, except 
that  they  are  for  firms  with  assets  above  and  below  $500,000 
respectively.  For the firms with assets above $500,000 in Table 4, 
the  findings  substantially  mirror  the  results  for  all  firms., 
including the sign, significance, and magnitude of the coefficients 18 
of  AGE  and  RELATE.  One  notable  exception  in  Table  4  is  the 
positive  and  significant  coefficient  of about  .35 in column  3 on 
ARINV.  This suggests that for firms above $500,000, being secured 
by accounts receivable and inventory may be an important indicator 
of higher.loan.risk,  .for..which.the..bank-chargen~an..additiona1  risk 
premium  of about 35 basis points.n 
In contrast,  in the regressions  for firms below  $500,000  in 
assets  in  Table  5,  only  one  of  the  independent  variables  is 
statistically  significant,  and the R2r~ are about  half  those  for 
firms above $500,000.- This suggests that  the pricing of bank loans 
to very small firms may be relatively idiosyncratic -- the terms of 
these  loans  may  depend  more  on  the  personal  reputation  of  the 
owner-manager  than on the observed characteristics  of the firm. 
Overall,  the results of the loan rate tests suggest  that the 
bank-borrower  relationship  plays  an important  role  in commercial 
loan  pricing,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  very  smallest 
borrowers.  Our results are generally consistent with the theoreti- 
cal models of Boot and Thakor  (1993) and Petersen and Rajan  (1993), 
both  of which  generate  a negative  association  between  loan rates 
and the length of the bank-borrower  relationship. 
Collateral  Tests 
In  order  to  determine  whether  collateral  requirements  are 
"Some caution should be exercised in interpreting this result 
because  ARINV  financing  typically  requires  that  banks  closely 
monitor the collateral.  Thus, the higher PREM for ARIMl  loans may 
be partly  explained  by the costs of this monitoring  to the extent 
that these  costs are not paid for by fees. 19 
greater or lesser for borrowers with longer banking relationships, 
we  use  logit  models  to  examine  the  probability  of  an  L/C  being 
secured.  Recall  that Boot and Thakor's  (1993) model predicts  that 
collateral  will  less often  be pledged  for borrowers  with  longer 
relationships.  This  prediction  is  also. consistent  .with  the 
conventional  wisdom  among bankers. 
Unlike  the  loan  interest  rate  data  analyzed  above,  data  on 
collateral  are available  for u  firms with L/Cs,  not  just those 
whose last loan was a floating-rate, prime-based draw under an L/C. 
The  explanatory  variables  again  include  the  firm's  financial, 
governance,  and industry characteristics,  as well as the informa- 
tion/relationship  variables.  The other contract  variables,  GUAR 
and  COMPBAL,  are  excluded  from  the  right  hand  side  of  these 
regressions  because  of  the  possibility  that  the  collateral, 
guarantee,  and compensating  balance decisions are co-determined." 
Logit regressions for the probability of any type of collater- 
al being pledged  (i.e., Prob(COLLAT)) are shown in Table 6.  Column 
one shows the results  using the entire data sample.  The  coeffi- 
cients of the information/relationship  variables,  AGE and RELATE, 
12We  examine  this  co-determination  problem  by  also  running 
separate collateral regressions on two subsets of the data -- L/Cs 
with  personal  liability  (corporations  with  a  guarantee,  sole 
proprietorships,  partnerships)  versus  those  without  personal 
liability  (corporations  without  a guarantee).  These  additional 
logit  regressions  (not shown)  suggest  that  our  results  reported 
below generally  hold for both of these groups and are robust. 20 
are both highly  significant  and negative  in this regression.13  As 
above  for  the  loan  rates,  the  magnitudes  of  these  coefficients 
suggest  that  they  are  economically  significant  in  determining 
whether  collateral  is pledged.  The coefficients of AGE and RELATE 
of about -.020 and -  .026,respectively  ,_.suggest.~hat.an.additional 
10  years  of business  experience with a constant banking  relation- 
ship lowers the probability that a firm pledges collateral by about 
11 percentage  points  (evaluated at the mean  probability  of  53%, 
(lo*.020 + 10*.026)*.53*(1-.53)). 
The coefficients of  the information/relationship  variables are 
again negative and of economically meaningful magnitudes  using the 
subsamples  of firms above and'below  $500,000  in assets,  shown  in 
columns two and three, respectively.  However, the AGE coefficient 
in  the  above-$500,000  regression  and  both  the  AGE  and  RELATE 
coefficients  in the below-$500,000 regression are not statistically 
significant.  This may at least partly reflect a loss of statisti- 
cal  test  power in the smaller subsamples.  As well, the explanatory 
power  of  the  below-$500,000  regression  is  considerably  lower, 
presumably  reflecting  a finding that the terms of bank  lending to 
very  small  firms  is quite  idiosyncratic  to the  owner-manager  and 
not well explained  by our firm-level economic variables. 
In Table 7 the same logit regressions were run except that  the 
dependent  variable  is the probability  that the loan is secured  by 
13The positive  coefficient  on  AGE  is  consistent  with 
results  of  Scott  and  Smith  (1986).  They  did  not,  however, 
data on our RELATE variable. 
the 
have 21 
accounts  receivable  and/or  inventory  (ARINV).  The  decision  to 
pledge this type of collateral which requires intensive monitoring 
by  the  bank  may  have  different  motivations  than  pledging  other 
collateral.14  The  results  for  the  information/relationship 
variables  in Table  7 are much  the  same_  as _in_.Table.6  -where the 
dependent  variable  was the probability  of any type of collateral. 
Again,  the  coefficients  of  AGE  and  RELATE  are  negative  and  of 
economically  significant magnitudes  for the full sample and the two 
subsamples.  The AGE  coefficient  in the over-$500,000  regression 
becomes  statistically  significant, whereas  it was not in Table  6, 
but  both  the  AGE  and  RELATE  coefficients  remain  statistically 
insignificant  in the under-$500,009  regression. 
Thus, the collateral  findings generally  imply that the older 
a firm is and the longer its banking relationship,  the less often 
it will pledge collateral.  These results are consistent with Boot 
and Thakor  (1993), who demonstrate that requiring collateral  early 
in a relationship  may be useful in solving a moral hazard problem. 
The  findings  are also consistent'with  the conventional  wisdom  in 
banking.  As above for the PREM regression results, the collateral 
findings  suggest that information about the firm is revealed  over 
time.  Young firms with new banking relationships may be willing to 
incur the costs associated with collateral because  they know that 
pledging  collateral  attenuates  the  problems  associated  with 
14An  alternative  specification would be to use a trichotomous 
logit with  the  choices  being ARINV,  OTRERSEC,  and no collateral. 
Regressions  run. under  this  alternative  were  not  materially 
different  from those reported. 22 
asymmetric  information.  Over time, the firms are able to demon- 
strate  some  project  success  to the  lender, who  then  reduces  the 
collateral  requirements. 
The data shown in Tables 6 and 7 may also be used to investi- 
gate  _the..,.association.  -between .-collateral  .-and -borrower  risk. 
Borrower  risk  should  be distinguished  from  loan  risk,  which  was 
investigated above with the loan rate data.  Borrower risk does not 
include the risk-reducing effects of the pledged collateral  itself. 
In  Table  6,  the  leverage  coefficient  (LEV)  is  positive  and 
statistically  significant in all three  regressions, suggesting that 
more  leverage  is associated with a higher probability  of pledging 
collateral.  Similarly, in Table 7, the LEV coefficient  is positive 
in all three regressions  and statistically  significant  in all but 
the  below-$500,000  subsample.  This  evidence  of  a  positive 
association  between borrower risk and the likelihood of collateral 
being  pledged  is  consistent  with  earlier  studies  (Hester  1979, 
Berger  and Udell  1990,1992)." 
V.  Conclusion 
Our  analysis  highlights  the role of relationship  lending  in 
commercial  bank  loan  contracting.  The  evidence  indicates  that 
small firms with longer banking relationships borrow at lower rates 
and are  less  likely to pledge  collateral  than other  small  firms. 
"Note, however, that the coefficients of the financial ratios 
other  than  LEV  in  Tables  6  and  7  are  generally  statistically 
insignificant  or  fail  to have  signs  that  consistently  associate 
collateral  with either greater or lesser borrower  risk. 23 
These  effects  appear  to  be  both  economically  and  statistically 
significant.  The  results  are  consistent  with  the  financial 
intermediation  literature  which  emphasizes  that  banks  produce 
private  information  about  borrower  quality  (e.g.,  Diamond 
1984,1991,  Ramakrishnan  and Thakor 1984,..Boyd._and..Prescott  1986). 
Our empirical results also suggest  that  banks accumulate increasing 
amounts of this private information over the duration of the bank- 
borrower relationship.  In addition, the findings in this study are 
consistent  with  recent  theoretical  models  of  bank-borrower 
relationships  (Boot and  Thakor  1993,  Petersen  and  Rajan  1993), 
although  our  results  run  counter  to  the  predictions  of  other 
theoretical  models  (Sharpe 1990, Wilson  1993). 
Our analysis  attempts to extend two strands of the empirical 
literature that bear on relationship lending questions.  Studies of 
bank  uniqueness  found  that  the  existence  of  a  bank-borrower 
relationship  increases  firm value,  and that  the  strength  of the 
relationship  --  as  measured  by  the  distinction  between  the 
announcements  of L/C  renewals  versus  newly  issued  L/Cs  --  often 
generate  market  value as well.  'Their results are consistent  with 
the notion that banks acquire valuable private information over the 
course  of their  relationships 
firms. 
Our  study  differs  from 
with mostly  large, publicly  traded 
these  uniqueness  studies  in  three 
important  ways.  First, we focus on small, mostly untraded  firms, 
rather  than  large,  publicly  traded  firms.  Our  small  firms  are 
generally more dependent  on banks, and are more likely to have the 24 
type  of  asymmetric  information  problems  that  a  bank-borrower 
relationship  may resolve.  Second, we use a continuous  measure  of 
the strength of the bank-borrower  relationship,  the length of time 
that the bank has purchased L/Cs from its current bank.  We believe 
that  this  measure  dominates  the  simple..binomial_.proxy..of  .whether 
the  L/C  was  a  renewal  versus  a  new  issue  as  a  measure  of  the 
relationship's  strength.  Third, we are able to test directly  the 
predictions  of the recent theoretical  literature about the path of 
loan interest rates over the course of the relationship. 
Similar  to our analysis,  the second  strand  of the  empirical 
literature on relationship  lending focused on small firms, used the 
continuous  length of the bank-borrower relationship as a measure of 
its strength,  and tested the path of loan interest rates over the 
course  of  the  relationship  (Petersen  and  Rajan  1993,1994). 
However, an important difference from our study is that  this  second 
strand  of  studies  did  not  confine  themselves  to  L/C  loans.  We 
focus  on  just  bank  lines of credit,  excluding  from  our  data  set 
loans  which  are  primarily  Yransaction-driven,'t  rather  than 
"relationship-driven."  Our exclusion of transaction-driven  loans 
-- such as equipment  loans, auto loans, and mortgages  -- may avoid 
diluting  our relationship  lending results, and may explain why our 
results  concerning  the  pricing  of  bank  loans  differ  from  this 
second  strand  of empirical  literature. 
Finally,  our  study  also  differs  from  both  strands  of  the 
empirical  literature  in that  it analyzes  the association  between 
. 
the pledging of collateral and the bank-borrower relationship.  The 25 
relationship  lending model  of Boot and Thakor  (1993), as well  as 
the conventional  wisdom  in banking, emphasize the role of collater- 
al  in  the  evolution  of  the  bank-borrower  relationship.  Our 
empirical  result that collateral is less often pledged  in a mature 
relationship  is consistent with the.predicti.ons_sfEoot.and  Thakor 
and  the  conventional  wisdom.  Our results  may  also  help  clarify 
some of the issues in the collateral literature by controlling  for 
more  types  of collateral  and more  firm characteristics  than were 
previously  available. Referenoes 
Allen, Linda, Anthony  Saunders and Gregory F.  Udell.  "The Pricing  of 
Retail  Deposits:  Concentration  and  Information.11 Journal  of 
Financial  Intermediation  1, (1991), pp. 335-361. 
Amihud, Yakov, and Baruch Lev. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive 
for  Conglomerate  Mergers,"  Bell Journal  of Economics,  (1981), 
PP.  605-617. 
Avery, Robert B., and Allen N. Berger. "Loan Commitments and Bank Risk 
Exposure,?  Journal  of Bankina  and_Finance_l5,_.(February 199i), 
PP. 173-192. 
Berger, Allen N., and Gregory F. Udell. 
Bank Risk," 
"Collateral, Loan Quality, and 
Journal  of Monetarv  Economics  25,  (January 1990), 
pp. 21-42. 
.  "Some Evidence  on the Empirical  Significance  of 
Credit  Rationing,"  Journal  of Political  Economy  100,  (October 
1992), pp. 1047-1077. 
Berkovitch,  Elazar, and Stuart I. Greenbaum. "The Loan Commitment  as 
an Optimal Financing Contract,*1  Journal of Ouantitative Analysis 
26,  (March 1991), pp. 83-95. 
Besanko,  David,  and  Anjan  V.  Thakor.  "Collateral  and  Rationing: 
Sorting  Equilibria  in  Monopolistic  and  Competitive  Markets," 
International  Economic Review 28,  (1987a), pp. 671-689. 
"Competitive  Equilibrium  in  the  Credit  Market 
Under  Asymmetric  Information,"  Journal  of  Economic  Theory  42, 
(1987b), pp.  167-182. 
Best, Ronald and Hang Zhang. "Alternative Information Sources and the 
Information  Content -of 
press). 
Bester,  Helmut.  "Screening 
Imperfect Information," 
850-855. 
Bank  Loans."  Journal  of  Finance  (in 
Rationing  in  Credit  Markets  with 
gerican  Economic Review 75, (1985), pp. 
Billett, Matthew Thayer, Mark J. Flannery and Jon A. Garfinkel.  "The 
Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return." 
University  of Florida working paper  (June 1993). 
Black, Jane and David de Meza.  "Diversionary Tactics:  Why Loans to 
Small  Businesses  are  so  Safe,"  University  of  Exeter  working 
paper  (1992). 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  "Senior  Loan 
Officers Survey on Bank Lending Practices." Washington:  Board of 
Governors  of the Federal Reserve System  (May 1988). R-2 
Boot, Arnoud W. A. and Anjan V. Thakor.  "Moral  Hazard and Secured 
Lending in an Infinitely  Repeated Credit Market Game," Indiana 
University working paper (1993). 
and Gregory F. Udell. ItCompetition,  Risk Neut- 
rality and Lo&  Commitments,n  Journal  of Bankina and Finance 11, 
(September  1987), pp. 449-471. 
"Secured  Lending and Default Risk:  Equilibrium 
Analysis and 'Policy  .Implications..and._Empirical.Results,~~  The 
Economic Journal, (May  1991). 
Booth, James R. "Contract  Costs.  Bank Loans,  and the Cross-Monitorinq 
Hvnothesis,  I1  Journal of Financial  Economics  31 (1992),  pp. 2-41. 
"Secured  Debt and Corporate  Borrowing Costs,1@ 
Arizona State'University  working paper (February  1993). 
Boyd, John, and E.C. Prescott. "Financial  Intermediary-Coalitions," 
Journal of Economic Theory.  38, (1986),  pp. 211-232. 
Carey,  Mark,  Stephen  Prowse,  John  Rea  and  Gregory  Udell.  "The 
Economics of Private Placements:  A New Look, Financial  Markets, 
Institutions and Instruments  2 (July  1993). 
Chan,  Yuk-Shee,  and  George  Kanatas.  '*Collateral  and  Competitive 
Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information,'@  Journal 
of Finance 42 (1987),  pp. 345-364. 
Diamond, Douglas W. "Financial  Intermediation  and Delegated 
Monitoring  ,(I  Review  of Economic  Studies  51  (1984), pp. 393- 
414. 
"Reputation  Acquisition  in  Debt  Markets,"  Journal 
of Political konomy  97  (1989)  .pp.  828-61. 
“Monitoring  and Reputation:  The Choice Between 
Bank  Loans  and  Directly Placed Debt," Journa 
Economv 99 (1991)  pp. 688-721. 
Hester, Donald. "Customer  Relationships  and Terms of Loans:  Evidence 
from a Pilot Survey," Journal of Monev, Credit and Bankinq 11, 
(1979),  pp. 349-357. 
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Sharfstein. "Bank Monitoring 
and  Investment:  Evidence  from  the  Changing  Structure  of 
Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships,l'  in R. Glenn Hubbard 
ed. Asvmmetric Information. Corporate Finance and Investment, 
University of Chicago Press (1990a). 
. .  "The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of R-3 
Financial  Distress  in Japan," Journal of Financial  Economics 
(1990b), pp. 67-88. 
II  James, Christopher.  "Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 
Journal  of Financial  Economics  19,  (1987), pp. 217-235. 
James, Christopher, .and  Peggy Wier.  @#Borrowing  Relationships, 
Intermediation,  and  the  Cost  of  Issuing  Public  Securities,@' 
Journal  of Financial  Economics 28,  (1990), pp. 149-171. 
Lummer,  Scott  L., and John J. McConnell.  "Further Evidence  on the 
Bank  Lending  Process  and  the  Capital  Market  Response  to  Bank 
Loan Agreements,"  Journal of Financial Economics 25, (1989), pp. 
99-122. 
Nakamura,  Leonard  I. "Commercial Bank Information:  Implications  for 
the Structure  of Banking,  It  in Michael Klausner  and Lawrence  J. 
White,  eds.,  Structural  Chanae  in  Bankinq,  Irwin  Publishing 
(1993). 
Orgler, Yair.  "A Credit Scoring Model for Commercial  Loans," Journal 
of Money.  Credit and Bankinq 2, (1970), pp. 435-445. 
Petersen,  Mitchell  A. and Raghuram G. Rajan.  "The Effect of Credit 
Market  Competition  on Firm-Creditor  Relationships,"  University 
of Chicago working  paper  (February 1993). 
.  "The Benefits of Firm-Creditor  Relationships: 
Evidence  From Small Business  Data,  I1  Journal  of Finance  (forth- 
coming March  1994). 
Rajan, Raghuram  G. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between 
Informed  and Armslength  Debt," Journal of Finance  (1992). 
Ramakrishnan,  S. and A. Thakor. "Information Reliability  and a Theory 
of  Financial  Intermediation,"  Review  of  Economic  Studies  51 
(1984), pp. 415-432. 
Scott, Jonathan  A., and Terence C. Smith. "The Effect of the 
Bankruptcy  Reform Act of 1978 on Small Business  Loan Pricing," 
Journal  of Financial  Economics  16, (1986), pp. 119-140. 
Selz, Michael,  "SBA  is Rolling  Out Revolving  Loans  to  Small  Compa- 
nies: Capital-Hungry  Firms Can Draw on Credit Lines for Receiv- 
ables,  Inventory,"  Wall Street Journal  (March 11, 1994): B2. 
Shockley, Richard  and Anjan V. Thakor.  @@Information  Content  of 
Commitments  to Lend  in the Future:  Theory and Evidence  on the 
Gains  from  Relationship  Banking,"  Indiana  University  working 
paper  (January 1993). 
Slovin,  'Myron  B., Shane A. Johnson, and John L. Glascock.  "Firm Size 
27 R-4 
and the Information Content of Bank Loan Announcements."  Journal 
of Bankina  and Finance,  (in press). 
Swary, Itzhak, and Gregory  F.  Udell. @lInformation  Production  and the 
Secured Line of Credit,  IV  New York University working paper  (March 
1988). 
Wansley,  James W., Fayez A. Elayan and M. Cary Collins.  "Investment 
Opportunities  and Firm Quality:  An Empirical  Investigation  of 
the  Information  in .Bank_Lines .of  -Credit,*'  -The--University of 
Tennessee  working  paper  (May 1992). 
Wilson,  Patricia  Furlong.  "The Pricing  of Loans  in a Bank-Borrower 
Relationship, @I  Indiana University working paper  (July 1993). Table  1 
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CONTUCT  CHMUCTKRISTICS 
Premium over the prime  rate 
Equals one if loan is secured 
Equals one if loan is secured by accounts  receivable 
and/or  inventory 
Equals one if loan is secured by other  than accounts 
receivable  and/or  inventory 
Equals one if loan is guaranteed 
Equals one if loan requires  compensating  balances 
FINANCIAL  CHARACTERISTICS 
Leverage:  total debt/assets 
Pretax profit margin  0  of sales) 
Current ratio  ((current assets)/(current 
liabilities)) 
Quick ratio  ((current assets  - inventory)/(current 
liabilities)  ) 
Accounts  receivable  turnover  in days  ((accounts 
receivable)  /(sales/day)  1 
Inventory  turnover  in days  (inventory/(cost  of goods 
sold)/day) 
Accounts  payable  turn in days  ((accounts 
payable)/(cost  of goods sold)/day)' 
Total firm assets  (in thousands  of dollars) 
GOVERNANCE  CaARACTERISTICS 
Equals one if firm is a non-subchapter  S corporation 
Equals one if firm is a Subchapter  S 
Equals one if firm is a partnership 
Equal one if firm is a proprietorship  (excluded from 
regressions  as the base case) 
Equals one if firm is owner-managed 
Equals one if .at  least 50% ownership  is in one family INDUSTRY WCTBRISTICS 
Equals  one if in construction  industry 
Equals one if in services  industry 
Equals  one if in retail  industry 
Equals  one if in other industries  (excluded from the 








Number  of years  current owners have owned firm23 
Length of relationship  with current  lender in years? 
'Because of data availability,  cost of goods  sold per day was used  in place of 
purchases  per day. 
A maximum  limit of 30 years was imposed on AGE and RELATE. 
'If the firm was diffusely  held,  then AGE  equals  the number  of years  that the 
























































Variable Means - Lines of Credit 





















Nun.  Obs.  872  444  428 





















. 74  . 86 
. 13  -15 
. 10  .22 
.20  .27 
.57  .36 
16.04  11.13 
12.67  10.08 
'PREM available  for 374,  221  and  153  observations  only. 
2000~s  omitted. 
‘RELATE  available  for 863, 437  and 426  observations  only. Table 3 
Premium Over Prime Rate (Floating Only) for 











(OLS Regressiona  for  PBEM) 
hcluding  Loan  Including  Including  Loan 
Contract  Ttmma  All Variableq  Contract Terms 0x11~ 
1.8845**  2.1171**  l-3882** 
0.1106  0.2141 
-0.2337  0.0424 
0.0141  0.0091 
-0.0616  -0.0319 
0.2459  0.2092 
0.3521  0.3477 
0.0072  0.0075 
-0.0516  -0.0550 
ARTURN  0.0029  0.0029 
INVTURN  0.0007  0.0006 
APTURN  -0.0005  -0.0004 
LNTA  -0.0082  -0.0247 
CORP  -0.5929**  -0.6380** 
SUBS  -0.5390*  -0:5482* 
PART  -0.1784  -0.2060 
OWNMG  0.2877  0.2883 
CONC50  0.1927  .  0.2086 
CONSTR  0.2323  0.2735 
SERVICES  0.2577  0.2713 
RETAIL  0.1134  0.0905 
AGE  -0.0194*  -0.0181* 
RELATE  -0.0209**  -0.0206** 
Nun-i.  Obs.  371  371 
RZ  .0973  .  1022 
*Statistically  significant  at the 10% level. 
**Statistically  significant  at the 521  level. 
371 
-0044 Table 4 
Premium  Over Prime Rate (Floating Only) for 





















(OLS Regressions  for PREtd) 
Excluding  Loan 
















Including  Including  Loan 
$11 Variablea  Contract  Terms Only 
2.9344f  1.0645++ 
0.0161  0.3502* 
-0.4361  0.0907 
-0.0510  0.1625 















SERVICES  0.5341  0.5597 
RETAIL  -0.3023  -0.3335 
AGE  -0.0200*  -0.0193* 
RELATE  -O-0257**  -0.0266** 
Nun.  Obs.  219  219 
R?  . 1652  . 1750 
219 
.0177 
*Statistically  significant  at the 10% level. 
**Statistically  significant  at the 5% level. Table 5 
Premium  Over Prime Rate (Floating Only) for 
Loans Issued Under Lines of Credit - TA Below $500,000 
(OLS  Begre!ssions  for  PREbs) 
Ercluding  Loan  Including 
Variable  Contract  Terma  All Variablea 
INTERCEPT  1.8509  1.9705 
ARINV  0.1557 
OTHERSEC  -0.1808 
GUAR  0.1636 
COMPBAL  -0.0368 
LEV  0.0917  -0.0272 
PROFMARG  0.6124  0.6246 
CUR-T  0.0171  0.0098 
QUICKRAT  -0.0108  -0.0116 
ARTURN  0.0057  0.0061 
INVTURN  0.0011  0.0009 
APTURN  -0.0006  -0.0005 
LNTA  -0.0560  -0.0664 
CORP  -0.4166  -0.5156 
SUBS  -0.3136  -0.3298 
PART  0.1228  0.0793 
OWNMG  0.1244  0.1518 
CONCSO  0.1999  0.2145 
CONSTR  0.3126  0.3650 
SERVICES  0.2464  0.2773 
RETAIL  0.6499*  0.6520 
AGE  -0.0236  -0.0217 
RELATE  0.0042  0.0054 
Num.  Obs.  152  152 
R?  . 0883  -0941 
*Statistically  significant  at the 10% level. 
**Statistically  significant  at the 5% level. 
Including  Loan 







. 0073 Table 6 
Probability  Tests on Collateral (AU Types) 
Lines of Credit 














































10197.34  510.79  550.49 
18  18  18 
94.34**  79.92**  38.93** 
TA  Abova  TA  Balow 
#SOO.OOQ  $SOO.OOQ 
-1.7642  -5.5487+* 
2.7985ff  0.5646*+ 
0.3166  0.0816 
0.1165  0.0541 
-0.0531  -0.0805 
0.0020  0.0059* 
-0.0004  0.0006 
-0.0016  -0.0009 
0.1016  0.4001** 
-0.4897  0.0936 
-0.7290  0.4380 
-1.0032  0.8143f 
0.4954  0.0362 
-0.2237  0.2542 
-0.7807**  0.3710 
0.2089  O-5121* 
-0.6008**  0.4335 
-0.0130  -0.0188 
-0.0327**  -0.0154 
*Statistically  significant  at the 10% level. 
**Statistically  significant  at the 5% *level. Table 7 
Probability Tests on Collateral (A/R and Inventory) 
Lines of Credit 












































-  2LogL  968.48 
df  18 
Chi  Sq  Covariates  155.02** 
*Statistically  significant  at the 10% level. 
**Statistically  significant  at the 5% level. 










































437  426 
506.96  417.71 
18  18 
95.72**  62.49** 